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NoRTHwESTERN UNIvERsrrY ScHooL oF LAw
RAYMOND 0. CLUTTER, Editor
THE RIGHT OF AN OFFICER TO ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT
[MARYLAND]
In Romans v. State' the defendant was
convicted in the trial court for violating
a statute which made it a misdemeanor to
obstruct justice by endeavoring to influ-
ence, intimidate or impede any juror, wit-
ness, or officer in any court of the state.
The defendant was attempting to persuade
the prosecuting witness in an abortion
trial to go away and remain out of the
jurisdiction of the court until after the
trial. The young woman informed the po-
lice, and it was arranged that an inter-
mediary would give a signal when the
defendant arrived at a certain place to*
make arrangements for the witness' de-
parture. The police, standing at a distance,
saw the signal and arrested the defendant.
The defendant filed exceptions to the rul-
ings of the trial court admitting in evi-
dence two papers found on his person at
the police station after his arrest. It was
asserted that since the defendant was ar-
rested without a warrant, the arrest was
unlawful and any papers taken from him
while in custody under this arrest were
taken in an unlawful search and were,
therefore, inadmissible as evidence.
The Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the lower court upon the ground
that the arrest was lawful, since no war-
rant is needed to make an arrest when an
officer detects a person committing or
about "o commit a misdemeanor in his
. 178 Md. 588, 16 A. (2d) 642 (1940).
2 Magna Carta, Runnymead, June 15, 1215. "No
freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or dis-
seised, or outlawed, or banished, or any ways
destroyed, nor will we pass upon him, nor will
we send upon him, unless by the lawful judg-
ment of his peers, or by the law of the land."
s State v. Padgett, 316 Mo. 179, 289 S.W. 954
(1926).
presence. Since the arrest was lawful, the
evidence obtained from the person ar-
rested was admissible.
This case presents two problems. First,
when may an officer arrest without a war-
rant? Second, can a conviction be sus-
tained when based on evidence seized in
an unlawful arrest?
The liberty of the citizen has long been
secured by important common law restric-
tions upon arrest.2 These common law
rules have to a large extent been defined
and limited by statute,3 but where there is
no statute on the subject, any officer with
authority to preserve the peace has all the
common law authority of a constable or
watchman to make an arrest without a
warrant.
The first consideration, then, in a dis-
cussion of the right of an officer to arrest
without a warrant should be directed at
defining the common law rules of arrest.
These can be divided into two categories
-the right to arrest without a warrant in
the case of felonies and that right in the
case of misdemeanors.
At common law, a peace officer has the
right to make an arrest without a warrant
to prevent the commission of a felony. 5
An officer must always interfere to pre-
vent an attempted felony when he has
reasonable grounds to believe that a fel-
ony is about to be committed,8 and may
4 The term "policeman" is the legal equivalent
of "watchman" at common law. State v. Evans,
161 Mo. 95, 110, 61 S.W. 590 (1900).
. Mapp v. State, 152 liss. 298, 120 So. 170
(1928).
8 He cannot arrest because he has some vagne
idea that a person is about to commit a felony.
State v. Zupan, 155 Wash. 80, 283 P. 671 (1929).
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arrest the offender although the attempt
to commit the felony is only a misde-
meanor.7 This seems to be a sound rule
even when the attempt to commit the fel-
ony is only a misdemeanor because most
attempted felonies involve a breach of the
peace and it is generally recognized that
an officer may arrest without a warrant
to prevent breach of the peace. But there-
must be an immediate danger of an injury
and not merely a threat of some future
indefinite injury.8
An officer may arrest a person without
a warrant who is in the act of committing
a felony. In this case part of the criminal
act must be committed in the presence of
the officer and the crime must be in fact
partly accomplished.
This presents the question as to what is
meant by "in the presence of the officer."
An offense is said to be committed in the
presence of an officer if any of his senses
afford him knowledge that a felony is be-
ing committed. Thus where an officer re-
ceives knowledge through the sense of
sight,9 smell,'0 or hearing" the offense is
said to be comii :. -i in his presence. It
has also been held that such knowledge
may be gained by the officer through a
mechanical apparatus. 2 Apparently an
arrest could be made without a warrant if
the officer received knowledge through the
sense of touch or taste, although there
seem to be no cases on the subject. Al-
though the offense is committed in the
officer's immediate vicinity, it is not in his
presence if he does not know of its com-
mission." Likewise, where the officer does
not know that an offense is being com-
mitted until after a search, it is not com-
7 Clark, Crim. Pro. §12 (1895).
8 Geroux v. State, 40 Tex. 97 (1874); See Ky.
L. J. 229 (1936) for a discussion of this point.
0 Robinson v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 53, 268
S. W. 840 (1925). Officer saw imprint of pistol
in pocket.
'( See 15 Minn. L. Rev. 359 (1931).
1 State v. Peters .. Mo. .. , 242 S. W. 894
(1922).
12 U. S. v. Harnish, 7 F. Supp. 305 (D. C. Me.
1934); See note, 19 Minn. L. Rev. 468 (1935).
13 State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N. W.
789 (1923).
14 Douglas v. State, 152 Ga. 379, 110 S. E. 168
(1921).
'- Heyward v. State, 161 Md. 685, 158 A. 897
(1932).
mitted in his presence so as to justify
arrest without a warrant.14 But an arrest
without a warrant is always justified
where the offender admits that he is com-
mitting an offense.'9 Where an officer law-
fully stops or restrains the person and an
offense is committed in his presence he
may arrest without a warrant,0 but where
"the facts constituting the offense are made
known only after an unlawful arrest the
offense is not committed in the officer's
presence.' 7 The fact that an officer is un-
lawfully on the premises, however, does
not make it illegal for the officer to arrest
without a warrant if the offense is com-
mitted in his presence.'8
A third situation at common law where
an officer may arrest without a warrant is
where the person has committed a felony
although not in the presence of the offi-
cer. 9 This rule of law is necessary for the
efficient administration of justice. If an
officer had to get a warrant every time he
saw a criminal his chances of arresting
him would be considerably diminished.
An officer under the common law can
also arrest without a warrant where a fel-
ony has in fact been committed and the
officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that the person arrested is the offender,
although it turns out later that the per-
son arrested is innocent.20 Reasonable sus-
picion, however, is not mere suspicion. It
must be a suspicion that would induce a
reasonably prudent man to believe that
the suspect is guilty of the crime.2" But if
an officer believes that one of two people
committed the crime he may arrest both
of them, 2 although he knows that one is
innocent. Some cases seem to have gone
Is People v. Lewis, 269 Mich. 382, 257 N. W.
843 (1934).
17 Catching v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 439,
264 S. W. 1067 (1924).
is Ex Parte Ajuria, 57 Cal. App. 667, 207 P.
515 (1922). Contra: Taylor v. State, 120 Tex.
Cr. 268, 49 S. W. (2d) 459, 461 (1932).
19Cline v. U. S., 9 F(2d) 621 (C.C.A. 9th,
1925)."
20 Clark, Crim. Pro. §10-12 (1895); Common-
wealth v. Cheney, 141 Mass. 10Z 6 N. E. 724
(1886).
2lMaghan v. Jerome, 88 F. (2d) 1001 (App.
D. C. 1937).
22 ". . . the public interest in the punish-
ment of a felon requires the other's arrest for
the purpose of securing his custody pending in-
CRIMINAL CASES
so far as to justify arrest if the officer
knew any facts that tended to associate
the arrestee with the offense as a possi-
ble perpetrator.23 It is usually said that
credible information from others is
grounds for a reasonable suspicion of
guilt.24 The federal cases seem to point in
both directions.2 5 Apparently no Federal
Court has specifically held that informa-
tion from a credible person is sufficient,
since all the cases involved additional cir-
cumstances. An anonymous communica-
tion is clearly insufficient,20 but it may
justify an investigation and if it squares
with other information, it may be consid-
ered one of several factors as a ground for
suspicion.27 Information received from a
stranger may be reasonable grounds for
suspicion if the officer talks to the person
and thus has a chance to judge his cred-
ibility.28 A telegram from another officer
that he has a warrant for the arrest of a
particular person gives the recipient rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the per-
son named committed the felony for which
the warrant was issued.19
A final situation under the common law
in which an officer is justified in arresting
without a warrant ii felony cases is where
the officer reasonably suspects that a fel-
ony has been committed and that the per-
son arrested committed it. The arrest is
justified even though no felony has in fact
been committed.3 0 The test of reasonable
vestigation." Restatement, Torts §119, Comment
j (1934).
23 See note, 31 J. C. L. 465, 466 (1940).
24 Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Ia. L. Rev.
201, 239 (1940).
25 See comment, 25 Ia. L. Rev. 368 (1940) for
a collection of the cases.
26 People v. Guertins, 224 Mich. 8, 194 N. W.
561 (1923).
27 People v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45, 196 N. W.
971 (1924).
28U. S. V. Baldocci 42 F (2d) 567 (S.D. Cal.,
1930) tends to support the view that informa-
tion from a credible person alone is not enough
to justify arrest without a warrant, while
Brady v. United States, 300 Fed. 540 (C. C. A.
6th, 1924) and Ard. v. U. S., 54 F. (2d) 358
(C. C.A. 5th, 1931) support the opposite view.
" Kratzen v. Mathews, 233 Mich. 452, 206 N.
W. 882 (1926).
30 The early English rule was that an officer
could arrest on suspicion only if a felony had
in fact been committed. This requirement of
actual commission of the felony was later repu-
suspicion in this situation is substantially
the same as that laid down above.
The right at common law of an officer
to arrest without a warrant is more lim-
ited in misdemeanor cases. An officer has
the right to arrest without a warrant for a
misdemeanor committed in his presence if
it amounts to a breach of the peace.:" but
he cannot arrest without a warrant if the
misdemeanor is not committed in his pres-
ence.3 2 Under the view of some courts an
officer can arrest without a warrant where
a breach of the peace is threatened.3 3 To
justify such an arrest, however, there
must be not only a threat, but some overt
act in attempted execution of the threat.
The cases are divided as to whether, an
officer can arrest without a warrant when
he has reasonable grounds to suspect that
a misdemeanor has been committed in his
presence. One line of authority holds that
the misdemeanor must in fact have been
committed or attempted,3 4 and the officer
must determine at his peril whether an
offense has been committed or not." 5 The
other line of cases hold that the officer is
justified in making the arrest if he has
reasonable cause to believe that a misde-
meanor has been committed in his pres-
ence.38 Under no circumstances, however,
can an officer arrest without a warrant for
a misdemeanor on mere information or
suspicion.37 In order for an arrest with-
out a warrant in the case of a misde-
diated in Samuel v. Fayne, 1 Doug. 359 (1780).
Under American &uthorities, "a peace officer
may, without a warrant, arrest a person where
he has reasonable grounds to believe that a
felony has been or is being committed, and
reasonable ground to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed or is committing
it." A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure §21
(d). See note, 24 Ky. L. J. 229, 231 (1936) for
a discussion of this point.
3' People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632, 173 N. E.
754 (1930).
2 Adair v. Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853,
26 A. L. R. 278 (1922).
33 See 4 Am. Jur., Arrest §26, n.6 for a collec-
tion of cases.
34 Adair v. Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853,
26 A. L. R. 278 (1922).
:15 Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S. W.
591, 42 A. L. R. 1194 (1925).
- People v. Esposito, 194 N.Y. S. 326, 118
Misc. 867 (1922).
37 6 C. J. S. Arrest §6 (c) (4).
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meanor to be legal, the arrest must be
made at the time the offense is being com-
mitted,38 or a reasonable time thereafter, 9
or upon immediate pursuit of the of-
fender.
4 0
Since arrest without a warrant can be
made at Common Law only for those mis-
demeanors which amount to a breach of
the peace, it becomes necessary to decide
what amounts to a "breach of the peace."
In general, it includes any violation of
public order or disturbance of the public
tranquility by any act which tends to pro-
voke or incite others to violence.41 Vio-
lence is not a necessary element,42 and the
threat of immediate force toward the per-
son, land or chattels of another which
constitutes a crime amounts to the breach
of the peace."s It may be occasioned by an
affray or assault,4 4 the use of.profane lan-
guage in public," or by needlessly making
loud noises."
G
At common law there were two excep-
tions to the rule that a misdemeanor must
amount to a breach of the peace in order
to justify arrc. wx ithout a Warrant-
namely, night walking, and riding armed.
This authority was given by statutes so
ancient that the statutory origin was for-
gotten and the privilege was regarded as
one existing at common law.
4 7
The common law rules have in most
states been either codified, enlarged, or
restricted by statutes. Some states pro-
vide that a peace officer is authorized to
arrest any person found by him to be vio-
lating any law of the state or any munici-
pal ordinance, or for any public offense
committed in his presence, even if it does
not amount to a breach of the peace.
48
25 People v. Ostrosky, 160 N.Y.S. 493, 95
Misc. 104, 34 *N.Y. Cr. 396 (1916).
s90leson v. Pinock. 68 Utah 507, 251 P. 23
(1926).
40 Oleson v. Pinock, supra.
41 As to what constitutes breach of the peace
see Wilgus, Arrest without Warrant,, 22 Mich.
L. Rev. 573-575 (1924).
42 State Ex rel Thompson v. Reichman, 135
Tenn. 653, 665, 188, S. W. 225 (1916).
43 A. L. I. Restatement, Torts §116.
44 Commonwealth v. Tobrin, 108 Mass. 426,. 11
Am. Rep. 375 (1871).
4r5 Davis v. Burgess, .54 Mich. 514, 20 N. W. 540
(1884).
46 People v. Johnson, 86 Mich. 175, 48 N. W. 870,
13 L.R.A. 163 (1891).
Other statutes restrict the power of a
police officer to arrest without a warrant
to cases where he has seen an offense
committed or knows it has been com-
mitted and has reasonable grounds to ap-
prehend, an escape. Under the latter
statutes the burden is upon the policeman,
and he acts at his peril as to whether an
offense has been committed.49 Other stat-
utes limit the authority of arrest without
a warrant to situations in which an im-
mediate arrest is necessary to prevent an
escape. 50 In several jurisdictions the en-
tire subject of arrest is regulated by stat-
ute. In these jurisdictions the statutory
mode of procedure must be closely follow-
ed or the arrest will be illegal. 51 The only
sure way for an officer to know the law
of arrest in his state is to study his state
statutes and compare them with the com-
mon law to determine whether his author-
ity has been enlarged or dimished, or
whether the statutes merely codify the
common law. Of course it is possible that
a statute might be declared unconstitu-
tional if tested,52 but it would be unwise
for an officer to depend on this.
The second problem suggested by this
case is whether a conviction should be
based on evidence seized in an unlawful
arrest. Federal and state constitutional
provisions make such a search and seizure
illegal. But there is nothing to indicate
that such evidence, while illegally ob-
tained, is not admissible evidence in a crim-
inal trial. The jrurpose of the various
constitutional provisions against unlawful
search and seizure was to provide against
any attempt by the legislature to author-
ize any unreasonable search or seizure. 53
47 Note, 23 Ky. L.J. 391, 394 (1935).
4SAdair v. Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853, 26
A. L R. 278 (1922).
49 U. S. v. Rembert, 284 F. 996 (D. C. Tex.,
1922).
50 Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S. W. 591,
42 A.L.R. 1194 (1925).
51 Cunningham v. Baker, 104 Ala. 160, 16 So.
68, 70 (1894).
52 Some statutes conferring authority on an
officer to make an arrest without a warrant for
a misdemeanor not committed in his presence
have been held unconstitutional. See note, 3
Ohio State University L. J. 329, 332 (1937).
53 Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 519-20, 28 S.
E. 624 (1897).
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Thus there is an immunity against the
legalization of a trespass. But once the
trespass has been made and the evidence
obtained, there seems little justification
for saying that it cannot be used. This
would be placing a double immunity in
the search and seizure clause-one against
the legalization of a trespass, and another
affecting a rule of evidence.54
Nevertheless, the federal and a growing
minority of state courts, including Illinois,
do not permit such evidence to be used.
The argument in support of this view is
that a suit for trespass is inadequate pro-
tection against unlawful search and seiz-
ure and to hold otherwise would make
the right worthless.5 5 The majority of
states allow evidence obtained in an ille-
gal arrest to be admitted-8 They advance
three main reasons for this rule: (1) Col-
lateral issues in the trial of the case will
be avoided.57 (2) the suit for trespass is
sufficient to enforce the right against un-
lawful search by officers, especially since
it is the only remedy against unlawful
search by private persons,58 and (3) if
the evidence is inadmissable, criminals
who are undoubtedly guilty will be allow-
5'See Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Search and Seizure, 19 lL L. Rev. 303, 308 (1925).
5 See Note, 31 J. C.L. 465. 467 (1940).
55 Wigmore on Evidence (3d. ed.) §§2183-2184.
57 State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616
(1938).
ed to go free because an overzealous officer
unwittingly made an illegal arrest and
search. 50
The fundamental problem confronting
the courts is the balancing of the need for
the protection of the individual aid the
necessity that the law shall not be flouted
by the insolence of officers, against thc
social need that criminals shall be appre-
hended and crime repressed. It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to arrive at a satis-
factory balance. It seems, however, that
the majority view that evidence obtained
on illegal arrest is admissible is the better
one. Certainly the constitutional and stat-
utory provisions against unlawful search
were never meant to be a shield behind
which criminals could hide. The citizen
who is wronged and should be protected,
has sufficient remedy in trespass.
In view of the previous decisions it
seems that the present case was correctly
decided. Even if the arrest had been il-
legal it would seem that under the better
view the evidence should have been ad-
mitted.
RAYMOND 0. CLUTTER.
58 Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519,
32 N.E. 910 (1893); People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y.
13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
59 People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E.
585 (1926); State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125
A. 636 (1924).
